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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The proceeding before the Sixth District Court involved Phoenix Indemnity 
Insurance Company (hereinafter "Phoenix Indemnity"), plaintiff and appellant, (naming 
its insured Jason David Merrill as a co-plaintiff) and Marlene Yardley and Yardley Inn, 
LLC (hereinafter "Yardley"), defendants and appellees, Civil number 9 8 0 6 0 0 2 2 8 . 
(R. 1). Yardley negligently injured Merrill in an automobile accident and Yardley's 
insurer, Guaranty National, had refused to provide coverage because it claimed a 
cancellation for non-payment of premium. 
Pursuant to Phoenix Indemnity's uninsured motorist coverage, Phoenix Indemnity 
paid the sum of $25,000.00 to Jason David Merrill. (R. 2-3). Upon paying the sums for 
which Yardley was legally liable, Phoenix Indemnity brought an action against her and 
her employer for indemnification. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue Presented for Review: Was the district court's denial of Phoenix 
Indemnity's motion for summary judgment erroneous? (R. 144). 
1 
Standard of Review: A district court's award or denial of a summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness. Rinderknecht v. Luck. 965 P.2d 564 (Utah App. 
1998) ("This appeal is from a summary judgment, which is granted only when 'there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 'Inasmuch as a challenge to summary judgment 
presents for review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments 
do not resolve factual issues, this Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, 
without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions.' Bonham v. Morgan, 
788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (per curiam). Accord Universal Underwriters Ins, Co. v. 
State Farm MuL Auto, Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)."). This 
Court will view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to Phoenix Indemnity. See United Park City Mines Co. v.Greater Park City 
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 
(Utah 1993); KAT. Inc. v. Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994). 
Issue Presented for Review: Does an implied contract of indemnity arise, as 
a matter of law, between an uninsured motorist and her victim's UM carrier requiring the 
uninsured motorist to indemnify and fully reimburse the UM carrier? (R. 35). 
Standard of Review: Question of law reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. See Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDING, AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Phoenix Indemnity filed a motion for partial summary judgment on or about 
December 3, 1999. (R. 144). Phoenix Indemnity argued that Yardley entered into an 
implied contract of indemnity with Phoenix Indemnity by failing to be insured at the time 
she injured Phoenix Indemnity's insured. On or about December 27, 1999, Defendants 
filed a memorandum in opposition arguing that no implied contract arose from 
Defendants' conduct or failure to be insured, and that Phoenix Indemnity's exclusive 
remedy was subrogation. (R. 219). On or about January 19, 2000, Phoenix Indemnity 
filed its reply memorandum setting forth additional authorities for the proposition that the 
doctrine of implied indemnity was properly applied to uninsured motorists and UM 
carriers. (R. 269). After a hearing, the district court ruled that no Utah precedent existed 
to support the establishment of an implied contract and, therefore, denied Phoenix 
Indemnity's motion on or about March 21, 2000. (R. 474). 
A jury trial was held on issues of negligence on March 20 - 22, 2000 and the jury 
found Yardley to be 60% at fault for the accident. (R. 542). A final order dismissing the 
matter was entered by the district court on or about August 3, 2000. (R. 578). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 20, 1997, at approximately 5:30 p.m., at or near the intersection 
3 
of 200 South and 200 East, Manti, Utah, two vehicles collided. (R. 148). 
2. Yardley operated one of the two vehicles involved in the collision and Jason 
David Merrill operated the other. (R. 148). 
3. As a result of the collision, Jason David Merrill suffered certain injuries and 
expenses which were submitted to and paid by Phoenix Indemnity under the personal 
injury protection coverage ("PIP") provided under an insurance policy insuring the 
vehicle driven by Mr. Merrill. (R. 148). 
4. Jason Merrill's medical expenses and injuries which arose out of the accident 
were of the type and in the degree that his right to maintain a cause of action for general 
damages was not abrogated by the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. (R. 148). 
5. Subsequent to the above-referenced collision, Mr. Merrill retained the law 
firm of Robert J. Debry & Associates to represent him with respect to recovery of medical 
expenses which were not covered by his PIP coverage, future medical expenses, and 
general damages. (R. 148). 
6. Yardley's purported insurance company, Guaranty National Insurance 
Company, refused to defend or indemnify Yardley because it denied that it insured 
Yardley on the date of the accident. (R. 148). 
7. Guaranty National filed a declaratory judgment action in the Third District 
Court against Yardley on February 25, 1998 attempting to establish Guaranty's lack of an 
obligation under the insurance contract based upon its allegation that Yardley had failed 
4 
to pay the required premium. (R. 148). 
8. On or about May 14, 1998, Mr. Merrill's attorney, G. Steven Sullivan, 
represented to Phoenix Indemnity that Yardley was uninsured based upon his discussions 
with Yardley's then-attorney, Michael Thompson, and Guaranty's attorney, Jill Zender. 
(R. 148); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-305(2)(c). 
9. Phoenix Indemnity determined that Yardley was uninsured under the terms of 
its insurance policy and under Utah law. (R. 148). 
10. On or about June 10, 1998, the present attorney for Yardley, Ralph 
Dewsnup, advised Mr. Merrill's attorney that Yardley was not insured under any other 
insurance policy at the time of the accident. (R. 148). 
11. Phoenix Indemnity fully investigated the facts surrounding the collision, it 
considered the evidence presented to it (including its PIP file and the settlement brochure 
provided by Mr. Merrill's personal injury attorneys), and determined that the majority of 
the fault for the accident rested with Yardley. (R. 148). 
12. On or about July 1, 1998, Phoenix Indemnity agreed to provide UM 
coverage to Mr, Merrill and, (1) in the discharge of its duty to Mr. Merrill and (2) for 
practical business considerations, settled with Mr. Merrill for the sum of $25,000.00. (R. 
148). 
13. In connection with its effort to enforce its implied indemnity contract with 
Yardley, Phoenix Indemnity has incurred attorney fees in the sum of one-third the amount 
5 
recovered from Yardley. (R. 148). 
14. It is appropriate that a summary judgment enter against Yardley in the sum 
of $40,868.00. 
6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Phoenix Indemnity conferred a substantial benefit upon Yardley by, in essence and 
effect, defending her against liability for her negligence and by paying the sums that she 
ought to have paid. Therefore, Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to be indemnified lest 
Yardley be unjustly enriched and thereby encouraged to continue to operate uninsured 
vehicles.1 
On October 20, 1997, Defendant Marlene T. Smith, a.k.a. Marlene Yardley while 
acting within the course and scope of her employment with the Yardley Inn, a Utah 
limited liability company ("Yardley"), failed to yield the right of way at a four-way 
intersection which was not governed by any traffic signals. Yardley's failure to yield the 
right of way proximately resulted in Jason Merrill's injuries. Phoenix Indemnity 
Insurance Company ("Phoenix Indemnity") insured Jason Merrill, and Yardley was 
1
 The public policy that uninsured motorists should indemnify UM carriers is 
especially important where, as here, Yardley asserts that she carried insurance. Insurers 
like Yardley's insurance company, Guaranty National, frequently deny coverage willy-
nilly under the mistaken belief that a UM carrier will simply step into the breach. 
Common "wisdom" holds that the UM carrier "clearly" is not in "privity of contract" and 
therefore the "direct-action rule" operates to "clearly" prohibit an action by the UM 
carrier against the third-party carrier which "clearly" "has no coverage" because the UM 
carrier "clearly" only "steps in shoes." The mere recitation of the above-quoted, widely-
misunderstood bromides convinces liability carriers to deny coverage or a defense to their 
insureds without a valid basis because it is highly profitable. Liability carriers should be 
encouraged to pay what they owe and to defend their insureds. This public policy can 
best be achieved by clarifying the rights of the UM carrier to enforce its equitable rights 
as set forth herein. Simply stated: UM carriers have resources to sue miscreant insurers, 
while many, if not most, insureds do not. 
7 
uninsured as defined by statute. 
Jason Merrill demanded relief from Yardley's purported insurance company 
(Guaranty National), but it refused to provide liability coverage for Yardley because she 
had not paid the required premium. Yardley knew of Mr. Merrill's demands and refused 
to participate personally. Because of Yardley's failure to be insured and refusal to 
maintain her own defense, Jason Merrill demanded relief from Phoenix Indemnity under 
his uninsured motorist coverage ("UM" coverage). Phoenix Indemnity adjusted and paid 
Mr. Merrill's claim as if it were the liability carrier for Yardley. 
Under Utah's statutory scheme requiring all motorists to maintain liability 
coverage combined with statutorily-required2 uninsured motorist coverage, an implied 
contract arose between Yardley and Phoenix Indemnity. Subsequent to Phoenix 
Indemnity's payment of UM benefits to Mr. Merrill, it became entitled to indemnity from 
Yardley. 
It is appropriate and equitable to enter a judgment against Yardley for the sum 
which was paid by Phoenix Indemnity as a result of Yardley's negligence. It is not 
inequitable to hold Yardley responsible for obligations she undertook by way of the 
implied contract with Phoenix Indemnity. 
2
 UM coverage is required in the absence of an express, written rejection by an 
insured who is informed about the coverage. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S ORDER ON PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS A FINAL JUDGMENT 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL; THEREFORE 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION. 
This Court has adopted an exception to the general rules relied upon by Yardley in 
her motion for summary disposition. Yardley argues that because the jury's judgment 
was satisfied by her insurance company, this appeal is moot. 
An exception to this rule exists only if the appeal relates to a 
separate and distinct part of the controversy and the disposition 
of one cannot affect the disposition of the other. Id., see also, 
Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Const. Co. v. Saint Joseph High School 
Bd., 794 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Utah App. 1990). 
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 1992); see also West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991). This appeal relates only to the 
separate and distinct issue of whether an implied contract of indemnity arose between 
Yardley as an uninsured motorist and Phoenix Indemnity as her victim's UM carrier. 
Moreover, Phoenix Indemnity explicitly reserved its right to appeal and conditioned the 
receipt of Yardley's payment on the appeal of this issue. 
If a judgment is entered as to one part of a controversy, which is 
separate and distinct from another part, and the disposition of the 
latter cannot affect the disposition of the former, a party may accept 
the money or property to which he is entitled, and not be deemed 
to waive his right to appeal as to other independent claims which 
the court refused to grant. 
Jensen v. Eddv. 514 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1973) (emphasis added). The general rule 
9 
from which the above-quoted exception is derived 
is based upon the reasoning that when a controversy has come to rest 
the litigation should cease. But pertinent to the problem here is an 
ancient aphorism: "If the reason for the rule is not present, the rule 
does not apply." Therefore, the general rule just stated does not 
usually prevent an appeal as to separate and independent claims 
where the controversy has not so come to rest. 
Id. This case has not come to rest by way of Yardley's partial payment because Phoenix 
Indemnity is entitled to recover the sums it is owed under its contract of indemnity. 
Subjecting its contractual rights to the jury's determination of the amount of damages 
recoverable was error by the district court. 
A court of equity will endeavor, to the extent of its powers, to bind 
men's consciences so far as they can be bound to a true and literal 
performance of their agreements, and will not suffer them to depart 
from their contracts at pleasure, leaving the party with whom 
they have contracted to the mere chance of any damages which a 
jury may give. It will, therefore, in a proper case, enforce a contract 
by enjoining violations of the terms thereof. 
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Hendrixson. 340 P.2d 416 (Utah 1959) (quoting 28 Am. Jur., 
page 270, section 77). 
10 
II. UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY EXPRESSED BY THE FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY STATUTE CREATED, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, AN IMPLIED CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY BETWEEN 
YARDLEY AND PHOENIX INDEMNITY. 
Phoenix Indemnity 's right of indemnification arises from the fact that it was 
compelled by the Financial Responsibility statute3 to pay Yardley's obligation, and if 
Phoenix Indemnity's right of indemnification were denied, such action would unjustly 
enrich Yardley. 
Utah's automobile insurance regime is sometimes referred to as owners or 
operators security and consists of, in general terms, liability coverage, no-fault (i.e., PIP 
coverage), uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and property damage coverage. 
These coverages (whether addressed collectively or individually) have been referred to 
herein as the "Financial Responsibility" statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-101. 
The comprehensive automobile insurance regime was initiated in the early 1970s 
and arose out of Utah's public policy favoring the protection of innocent victims by 
requiring all motorists to maintain certain coverages. By enacting the Financial 
Responsibility Act, the Legislature expressed its "interest in creating a more efficient 
process for liquidating personal injury claims and providing an incentive for persons 
driving Utah's highways to obtain motor vehicle insurance." Warren v. Melville. 937 
3
 An "uninsured motorist" includes someone who has insurance but whose 
"coverage for an accident is disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305(2)(c). 
11 
P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie. 606 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 
1980) (stating that in coupling Utah's no-fault statute with the Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Act, "the obvious legislative intent was to encourage compliance with the 
security provisions of the act.")). 
The adoption of the Financial Responsibility statute "substantially changed the 
public policy of this state by mandating that all Utah automobiles be covered by certain 
types of security." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) 
(invalidating a household exclusion clause below statutory minimums after the enactment 
of mandatory automobile liability insurance). The Call court rejected the argument that it 
should adopt the conclusions arrived at by foreign courts "since they were decided prior 
to the enactment of the no-fault automobile insurance laws and the requirement of 
mandatory automobile insurance." IcL; see also Dairvland Insurance Co. v. Smith, 646 
P.2d 737 (Utah 1982) (refusing to recognize follow Utah caselaw pre-dating the 
legislature's enactment of the Financial Responsibility statute). 
The comprehensive and mandatory nature of modern insurance law establishes an 
interrelationship between formerly unrelated entities. The relationship that is relevant to 
this Appeal is the UM carrier's provision of substitute liability coverage to uninsured 
motorists. Because the Financial Responsibility statute sets forth UM coverage as a 
required piece of the interdependent puzzle, uninsured motorists implicitly enter into a 
contractual relationship with the UM carrier that acts on behalf of the uninsured motorist. 
12 
Were it not so, people like Yardley and insurers like Guaranty would be encouraged to 
refuse to comply with the security provisions of the Financial Responsibility statute in 
violation of the central legislative purpose thereof. 
UM coverage is only provided because of the uninsured motorist's fault in failing 
to maintain liability coverage or the liability carrier's refusal to fulfill its obligations. For 
the foregoing reasons, among others, an implied contract arises, as a matter of law, at the 
time a payment is made under UM coverage. No similar implied contract arises from 
payments under collision coverage, comprehensive coverage, or PIP coverage because the 
payments under those coverages are to be paid by the first-party insurer without regard to 
the liability of the tortfeasor and without regard to the tortfeasor's maintenance of 
mandatory coverage.4 
4
 When an insurer seeks reimbursement of benefits paid under coverages other 
than UM coverage, the amount of reimbursement is properly determined according to 
principles of subrogation (i.e., tort principles and comparative negligence). However, 
indemnity requires "full reimbursement" of the amount of loss paid (of course, a UM 
claim is adjusted under tort principles and UM carriers invoke apportionment under the 
comparative negligence statute) because it is an action on a contract (i.e., an implied 
contract). 
Moreover, an action for indemnity can also be brought by the secondary insurer 
against the primary insurer to determine the primary insurer's contractual obligations. 
See Peterson v. Western Cas. and Sur. Co.. 425 P.2d 769 (Utah 1967) ("this action may be 
looked at somewhat differently than it would be in a suit between the primary parties to the 
insurance contract. As a member of the public injured by the insured, plaintiff became a 
third-party beneficiary of the policy, but she had no control over the conduct of the parties 
inter se. * * * there exists at least a temptation for an insurer to merely go through the 
motions of seeking the insured's cooperation without actually desiring it, and thus establish a 
defense to liability on the policy. * * * Inasmuch as the purpose of the insurance is to 
13 
III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE UNINSURED MOTORIST 
STATUTE AND THE REST OF THE FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ACT GIVES RISE TO AN IMPLIED 
CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY. 
Utah's public policy and statutory enactments require all motorists to maintain a 
minimum amount of liability insurance for the protection of innocent victims. This public 
policy would be frustrated if uninsured motorists were permitted to freely demand a 
defense and indemnification under the uninsured motorist coverage purchased by their 
victims or if primary liability carriers were encouraged to refuse payment of required 
benefits to their insureds.5 Therefore, an uninsured motorist or his or her primary insurer 
must fully reimburse6 a UM carrier that provides insurance for the uninsured motorist lest 
protect not only the insured, but the public generally, the right which arises in anyone injured 
by an insured motorist should not be regarded lightly, nor permitted to be subverted by other 
parties over whom the injured one has no control."). 
5
 "These holdings are indefensible. The courts are ignoring realities and 
encouraging insurers who are not concerned with their obligations to their insured in the 
hope that someone else will step into the breach.. . . Further, as a matter of public policy, 
courts should be demanding that insurers give prompt defense of claims to policyholders 
rather than to tolerate the shifting of responsibility with such impunity." Sharon Steel 
Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (quoting 7c John Allan 
Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4691, at 278 (Walter F. Berdal ed., 1979)). 
6
 Conceptually, it is instructive to consider the implied contract of indemnity and 
subsequent full reimbursement as the belated payment of insurance premiums by the 
"uninsured motorist." All motorists are required to maintain pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 41-12a-301(2). Normally, an insured pays a premium for an insurance policy. 
This premium is calculated by the actuarial determination of the pooled risk of certain 
fortuitous events occurring to individuals who are part of a group of persons covered by 
the insurance company. Therefore, the premiums are low. However, insurance 
purchased subsequent to the happening of an event will reflect the true cost of the loss 
14 
the uninsured motorist and/or her insurer become freeloaders. If freeloaders were not 
required to indemnify those who have paid their obligations, the freeloaders would be 
provided an incentive to refrain from maintaining insurance or paying insurance benefits. 
The present system of insurance would crumble under the weight of individual and 
corporate freeloaders. 
When, under the direction of statute, an insurance company acts in the place of an 
uninsured motorist, it is upon the implicit and equitable assumption that the UM carrier is 
to be indemnified by the uninsured motorist or their liability carrier for expenses incurred 
and payments made in the course of the transaction. The duty to indemnify is imposed 
(without respect to the indemnitor's acknowledgment of the duty) unless there is an 
express agreement to the contrary. The Restatement of Restitution states the general rule 
as follows: 
A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is 
owed by him but which as between himself and another should have 
been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from the other . 
Restatement of Restitution, Title A, Indemnity at § 76; see also Hanover Limited v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co.. 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting § 76 of the Restatement). 
And the authors of C.J.S. describe the duty of indemnity as follows: 
rather than the anticipated cost of a fortuitous loss multiplied by the risk of loss. Full 
reimbursement is just another way of expressing the cost of purchasing insurance to cover 
an event that has already happened where the costs and expenses are already determined. 
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One compelled to pay damages on account of the negligent or 
tortious act of another has a right of action against the latter for 
indemnity. 
42 CJ.S. Indemnity § 21, page 596. 
A. Yardley Was an Uninsured Motorist. 
Despite the statutory requirement that all motorists in Utah maintain liability 
insurance, Yardley was uninsured. The Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
mandatory liability insurance coverage "reflects a public policy requiring minimum 
coverage to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents." Farmers Insurance 
Exchange v. Call. 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). Under the Financial Responsibility statute 
an "uninsured motorist" includes someone who has insurance but whose "coverage for an 
accident is disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
31A-22-305(2)(c).7 
7
 The above-quoted statute may be interpreted as a codification of the 
common-law principle that a person whose claimed insurer denies coverage (and, by 
analogy and legal effect, that person's substitute liability carrier (a.k.a. the victim's UM 
carrier)) "is entitled to exercise the judgment of a prudent uninsured person in 
compromising the claim." Gibbs Smith, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar., 949 P.2d 337 
(Utah 1997) (quoting Simon v. Maryland Cas. Co.. 353 F.2d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 1965)). 
Moreover, "when an insurer disclaims liability on the basis of noncoverage, not only may 
the insured bring an action against the insurer, but in addition 'the insurer is bound by 
any reasonable compromise or settlement made by the insured.'" Id (quoting Waugh 
v. American Cas. Co.. 378 P.2d 170, 177 (Kan. 1963)). 
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B. The Role of The Uninsured Motorist Carrier. 
Phoenix Indemnity would not have owed any duty to its insured, Jason Merrill, for 
his general damages and medical bills in excess of $3,000 were it not for Yardley's 
failure to provide liability insurance. Phoenix Indemnity's duty arose because of 
Yardley's fault (i.e., her failure to comply with the requirements of the Financial 
Responsibility statute). Phoenix Indemnity, in effect, defended Yardley against the 
claims made by Phoenix Indemnity's insured because its duties were exactly coextensive 
with Yardley's duties. The Utah Supreme Court explained the nature of uninsured 
motorist coverage and the relationship between UM carriers and uninsured motorists in 
Chatterton vs. Walker as follows: 
The district court's attempt to enforce distinctions between [the 
uninsured motorist's] interests and [the UM carrier's] interests thus 
served no valid end. "The purpose of mandatory uninsured-motorist 
insurance is 'protection equal to that which would be afforded if the 
offending motorist carried liability insurance.... The insurer 
stands in the shoes of the uninsured motorist and must pay if [the 
uninsured motorist] would be required to pay.'" Fetch, 530 N.W.2d 
at 339 {quoting 8C John A. Appleman & Jean Appleman, Insurance 
Law and Practice, § 5086, at 307, 309-10). 
Chatterton v. Walker. 938 P.2d 255 (Utah 1997) (discussing the right of a UM carrier to 
intervene in insured's action against uninsured motorist) (footnotes, etc. omitted, 
emphasis added). In other words, Phoenix Indemnity's obligations toward its insured as 
the substitute liability carrier for Yardley was exactly coextensive with the duties owed 
by Yardley and only arose because of her fault (i.e., her failure to provide liability 
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coverage or a defense). 
IV. PRINCIPLES OF IMPLIED INDEMNITY ARE PROPERLY 
APPLIED TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UM 
CARRIER AND THE UNINSURED MOTORIST. 
As a preliminary matter, Phoenix Indemnity acknowledges that there is no reported 
appellate case in the State of Utah which directly addresses the interplay between the 
doctrine of implied indemnity and the uninsured motorist statute. However, Utah has 
adopted the common law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-1 (adopting common law as rule 
of decision in Utah courts). 
A rule of law, whether preexisting or newly established, that serves 
as the major premise of an adjudicatory syllogism, necessarily 
governs all subsequent cases properly falling within the scope of the 
rule. This is so even when the particular facts in subsequent cases 
are different and res judicata does not apply. 
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel.. 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992). And 
courts in other states have applied the doctrine of implied indemnity to uninsured motorist 
coverage. See, e.g.. Coleman v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co.. 930 F. 
Supp. 255 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (anticipating Mississippi law); See also Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.. 471 F.Supp. 1059 (M.D. Penn. 1979) 
(acknowledging the right of a UM carrier to sue a liability carrier and collect full 
reimbursement without respect to the liability carrier's coverage limits based upon the 
doctrine of equitable indemnification under § 76 of the Restatement where the liability 
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carrier wrongfully denied coverage to its insured causing the UM carrier to step into the 
breach caused by the liability carrier's wrongful conduct and to pay its insured under its 
uninsured motorist coverage). 
There are three elements of equitable8 indemnity. First, the prospective indemnitee 
(Phoenix Indemnity) must discharge a legal obligation owed to a third party (Jason 
Merrill). Second, the prospective indemnitor (Yardley) must also be liable to the third 
party (Jason Merrill). Third, as between the prospective indemnitor (Yardley) and the 
prospective indemnitee (Phoenix Indemnity), the obligation should be paid by the 
indemnitor (Yardley). See Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green. Inc.. 740 P.2d 
284 (Utah App. 1987); Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 
1984). 
The uninsured motorist statute provides as follows: 
(3) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(b) provides[9] coverage for covered persons[10] who 
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
8
 Equitable indemnity is also called "common-law indemnity" and "implied 
indemnity," and these three terms may be used interchangeably herein. 
9
 UM coverage is provided by insurance companies, and insurers providing UM 
coverage are "indemnitees" under the doctrine of implied indemnity. 
10
 "Covered persons" under the uninsured motorist coverage statute are "third 
persons" to whom a debt is paid by the indemnitee on behalf of the indemnitor under the 
doctrine of implied indemnity. 
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uninsured motor vehicles[n] because of bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death in limits that at least equal the minimum bodily 
injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies under Section 
31A-22-304. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-305. 
First, Phoenix Indemnity discharged a legal obligation governed by UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 31A-22-305 and its insurance policy under which it was obligated (coextensively 
with Yardley, but contingent upon her failure to provide liability insurance) to pay the 
liability of Yardley for its insured's damages. Second, Yardley was also liable 
(coextensively with Phoenix Indemnity, but Yardley's obligation was primary) to pay the 
damages suffered by Jason Merrill. Third, as between Yardley and Phoenix Indemnity, 
the obligation should be paid (should have been paid originally12) by Yardley. See Salt 
Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green. Inc., 740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1987); Perry v. 
Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d214, 218 (Utah 1984). 
11
 "Owners or operators of uninsured vehicles" are "indemnitors" under the 
doctrine of implied indemnity who implicitly agree to indemnify the indemnitee (the 
uninsured motorist carrier is the "indemnitee") for the sums paid to the third persons (i.e., 
"covered persons" or the "indemnitee's insured"). 
12
 It is the very nature of uninsured motorist coverage to be secondary. In other 
words, Phoenix Indemnity's obligation to indemnify Yardley's insured would not have 
arisen had Yardley fulfilled its obligation to provide liability insurance (i.e., Phoenix 
Indemnity's obligation would not have arisen in the absence of Yardley's fault). 
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V. IMPLIED INDEMNITY AND SUBROGATION ARE 
DIFFERENT, BUT NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. 
The primary (but superficial) objection to the proper application of the principle of 
implied indemnity to the uninsured motorist / UM carrier situation is the assertion that the 
UM carrier's exclusive remedy is subrogation.13 Such conclusory objections are without 
merit. 
The principle of indemnity is closely interrelated with the principle 
of subrogation, and oftentimes the possessor of the one right is also 
the possessor of the other. Both doctrines are based on the 
principle that a benefit has been conferred on defendant at the 
expense of plaintiff, but the principle of indemnity is more limited 
in application than that of subrogation, since not only must a benefit 
be conferred on defendant by a discharge of his duty or obligation, 
but the discharge must have occurred under circumstances in which 
plaintiff was, at the same time, discharging a personal obligation 
coextensive with that of defendant. 
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 3, page 566-67. 
In other words, Phoenix Indemnity is not entitled to indemnification (only 
subrogation) for the sums it paid for property damage or PIP because it was liable for 
those sums whether Yardley was insured or not. The sums paid out for PIP and PD were 
recoverable by subrogation under traditional principles of tort law and the application of 
comparative negligence principles by a jury. 
13
 Generally, this objection is supported by repetition of the phrase "steps in shoes' 
"privity of contract" and/or "plainly," "clearly" or other similar adverbs-masquerading-
as-argument, but no real or substantive analysis is ever presented because there is none. 
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The sums paid out because of Phoenix Indemnity's obligations which were exactly 
coextensive with Yardley's obligations, on the other hand, are recoverable under implied 
indemnification principles. And the fact and amount of Yardley's reimbursement 
obligation is properly established as a matter of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted § 76 of the Restatement of Restitution, and 
§ 76 sets forth examples to which it applies. The Restatement also acknowledges that 
"the general principles [set forth in § 76] are applicable to many types of cases." Id. at p. 
333. This case falls within the factual examples set forth in § 76 even though that section 
does not specifically mention the uninsured motorist statute (or any of the other factual 
circumstances to which the courts of the State of Utah have applied the concept). For 
example, the "third-party tort rule" was adopted in South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 
1279 (Utah App. 1988). No particular name was given to the indemnity concept when 
the court considered it in Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green, Inc., 740 P.2d 
284 (Utah App. 1987), Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 
1984) and Hanover Limited v. Cessna Aircraft Co.. 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988). See 
also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (analyzing a 
factual circumstance that would come within the "multiple sureties rule" although the 
court's analysis focused on the doctrine of subrogation). The courts only require that the 
three elements be met, and all three elements are met in this case. 
Yardley would have the Court invest her with its powers, the powers reserved to 
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the plaintiff,14 and the powers reserved to the Legislature in order to declare that Phoenix 
Indemnity's exclusive remedy is subject to her faulty understanding of subrogation.15 
Yardley seeks to limit Phoenix Indemnity's remedies to that single remedy which she 
14
 The United States Supreme Court's analysis of a defendant's claim of federal 
preemption is illustrative: 
It is true that when a defense to a state claim is based on the terms of 
a collective-bargaining agreement, the state court will have to 
interpret that agreement to decide whether the state claim survives. 
But the presence of a federal question, even a § 301 question, in a 
defensive argument does not overcome the paramount policies 
embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rule — that the plaintiff is 
the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on 
the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing 
claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in 
state court. When a plaintiff invokes a right created by a 
collective-bargaining agreement, the plaintiff has chosen to plead 
what we have held must be regarded as a federal claim, and removal 
is at the defendant's option. But a defendant cannot, merely by 
injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly 
a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal 
law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated. 
If a defendant could do so, the plaintiff would be master of 
nothing. 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams. 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987). 
15
 The term "subrogation" is used by the courts as shorthand for any cause of 
action based upon the rights of a non-party. Such causes of action include, but are not 
limited to, equitable subrogation, legal subrogation, statutory reimbursement, assignment, 
trusts, indemnification, etc. See, e.g.. Bear River Mutual v. Wall 367 Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1999) (clarifying that prior use of "subrogation" to mean "statutory right of 
reimbursement" did not limit the statutory right. The court explained: under the equitable 
doctrine of subrogation, an insurer seeking PIP reimbursement would "stand in the shoes" 
of its insured and would collect nothing because the insured's right to recover special 
damages is abrogated by the no-fault statute, and the tortfeasor is granted immunity — if 
she maintains insurance). 
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deems acceptable — negligence. No legal authority was presented for the unlikely 
proposition that the existence of one right necessarily precludes the existence of 
alternative or cumulative rights or causes of action. 
Yardley asks for this drastic alteration of the adversarial model of jurisprudence in 
order to protect herself from the natural results of her own failure to maintain liability 
insurance. The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation is borne of equity and Implied 
Indemnification is borne of equity. The only method by which Yardley could deny 
Phoenix Indemnity's right to indemnification is the allegation and proof (i.e., admissible 
evidence) that Phoenix Indemnity's right of indemnification would not be equitable. 
Yardley has not presented such an argument — because no such argument can be made.16 
For Yardley to establish a superior equity and thus to be entitled to prevail, she 
must present proof which establishes that the damages paid in connection with Phoenix 
Indemnity's settlement with its insured were paid in bad faith, fraudulently, or as a result 
of collusion; otherwise, Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to full reimbursement of the 
payment made by it to Jason Merrill. 
The sums paid to Jason Merrill were paid because Phoenix Indemnity owed 
obligations to him which were exactly coextensive with Yardley's obligations to him. 
Therefore, such sums are recoverable under implied indemnification principles. The fact 
16
 In addition, Yardley comes to this Court with unclean hands; therefore, even if a 
logical argument could be made, Yardley would be prevented from making it. 
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and amount of Yardley's reimbursement obligation is properly established as a matter of 
law. 
VI. THE OPINIONS FROM FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS WHICH 
HAVE DENIED UM CARRIERS A RIGHT OF EQUITABLE 
INDEMNITY ARE NOT PERSUASIVE. 
Yardley opposed Phoenix Indemnity's motion for summary judgment by quoting 
the conclusions reached by courts from foreign jurisdictions. The conclusions set forth 
tenuously supported her assertions17 and she asked the district court to blindly adopt those 
courts' conclusions. See Yardley's Opposition Memo at pp. 8-9 (quoting Shelter Ins. Co. 
v. Arnold. 940 S.W.2d 505 (Ark. App. 1996); Russell v. Evans. 920 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 
App. 1996)). This Court may not blindly adopt the conclusions of foreign courts. In 
order for the Court to follow a foreign jurisdiction's legal conclusion, the party proposing 
the conclusion must prove that the underlying reasoning is both logical and persuasive. 
17
 Yardley also attempted to distinguish the foreign jurisdiction case cited by 
Phoenix Indemnity in which the court acknowledged a UM carrier's right of equitable 
indemnification from the uninsured motorist. Yardley's attempted distinction fails 
because it takes the court's statement out of context. The court questioned the insurer's 
superior right of equity only because of the fact that the insurer had missed the statute of 
limitations applicable to its other causes of action because of its own decision to deny the 
insured's claim and pursue a declaratory judgment action against him. The court's basis 
for the comment quoted by Yardley is the maxim that equity will not protect or rescue 
those who could have (but failed to) protect themselves. Coleman v. American 
Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co.. 930 F. Supp. 255, (N.D. Miss. 1996). Yardley did not 
question the fact that Phoenix Indemnity has a superior right in equity, and she may not 
question that fact because of her unclean hands. See also Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 471 F.Supp. 1059 (M.D. Penn. 1979). 
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See, e.g., Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 at n. 4 (Utah 1998) ("While 
federal cases are instructive, and perhaps even persuasive, they are by no means 
authoritative and certainly not controlling."). The cases relied upon by Yardley are 
logically flawed and haphazardly reasoned. 
The first flaw in the cases relied upon by Yardley is that the courts based their 
conclusions on the fact that a UM carrier is contractually obligated18 to pay UM benefits 
to its insured. The gravity of this truth is never explained, but its status as the foundation 
of their rulings is clung to with white-knuckled tenacity. 
The conclusion relied upon by Yardley was first set forth by the Indiana Court of 
Appeals in 1972.19 American States Insurance Co. v. Williams, 278 N.E.2d 295 (Ind. 
App. 1972). The court's reasoning in that case was perfunctory, to put it mildly. 
Nevertheless, courts such as the Arkansas and Missouri courts quoted by Yardley in her 
memorandum submitted to the district court, have blindly quoted Williams without ever 
analyzing the flawed logic or the substantial changes to public policy effected by 
mandatory, comprehensive automobile insurance regimes. See Farmers Insurance 
Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
18
 The foreign courts' archaic conclusions are based upon unarticulated 
assumptions which pre-date modern mandatory automobile insurance statutes. 
19
 Every court (or nearly every court) that has rejected the application of implied 
indemnity principles to uninsured motorist coverage has relied on Williams either directly 
or indirectly through several layers that can be traced back to Williams. 
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The foundation of the Williams conclusion is that indemnification was not 
available because "the duty of the insurer to pay damages arises solely20 out of its contract 
with its insured." Id at 299-300. 
The first flaw is painfully obvious — to wit: The foundational basis for refusing to 
acknowledge the right to indemnification is the first element of indemnification. 
The first element of implied indemnity is: The prospective indemnitee must 
discharge a legal obligation owed to a third party. See Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. 
Galbraith & Green, Inc., 740 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1987). 
The second flaw inherent in the quoted foreign cases is the fact that the Financial 
Responsibility statute did not exist in 1972 (at least not in Utah). As explained above, the 
justifications underlying cases decided prior to the adoption of comprehensive, mandatory 
insurance schemes are not dispositive in modem mandatory insurance practice. Even if 
the Williams conclusion were well-reasoned in 1972 in Indiana, its conclusion would 
carry no weight in Utah in the year 2001. 
UM coverage is an indispensable element of the Financial Responsibility statute. 
The legislature intended that all motorists should be protected from catastrophe. The 
non-sequitur set forth by the Indiana, Arkansas, and Missouri cases relied upon by 
Yardley is that because the first element of the cause of action for implied indemnity is 
But see Utah Financial Responsibility Act. 
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satisfied, that cause of action should be dismissed. This Court may not blindly adopt the 
Williams conclusion. 
Williams and its progeny do not purport to interpret Utah law, and they were 
poorly reasoned when they were issued. Subsequent to the adoption of comprehensive 
insurance schemes they are nothing more than worthless relics from a bygone era. 
VII. THE "LIABILITY" REFERENCED IN THE SECOND ELEMENT 
OF THE THREE-PART TEST FOR IMPLIED INDEMNITY IS 
SATISFIED BY MEETING THE ELEMENTS SET FORTH IN 
THE RESTATEMENT AT § 78. 
Yardley acknowledged that the facts of this case satisfy the first and third elements 
of the three-part test for the application of implied indemnity principles. But Yardley 
denied that she was "liable" for the debt because there had not been a jury trial to fix her 
percentage of her negligence. See Opposition Memo at p. 10. Yardley's "liability" is not 
negligence liability.21 Her "liability" is contractual liability because the undisputed facts 
21
 Yardley invoked (at pp. 10-11 of its opposition memorandum) the word 
"culpability" from Hanover to support her view that this is a negligence action. 
"Culpability" relates to "culpability" between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. The 
fact that Yardley claims that the third party was comparatively negligent does not address 
the legal precept referenced by the word "culpability." What it means is that where the 
indemnitor and indemnitee are in pari delicto, no right of indemnification exists between 
them (only contribution). Phoenix Indemnity was not in pari delicto with Yardley. The 
other terms used to described this point of law are "active negligence" and "passive 
negligence." One who is passively negligent (i.e., one who is vicariously negligent such 
as a UM carrier or an employer) may recover in indemnity from one who is actively 
negligent (such as Yardley). If Phoenix Indemnity were actively negligent (i.e., if it had 
driven one of the vehicles that collided), it would be precluded from maintaining a claim 
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satisfy the elements set forth in § 78 of the Restatement of Restitution. 
When Yardley chose to drive an uninsured vehicle and negligently injure Jason 
Merrill, she entered into a contract22 with Phoenix Indemnity as a matter of law. She is 
bound by those contractual obligations which include the full reimbursement of the 
amount Phoenix Indemnity paid to Jason Merrill. 
Yardley has expressed her opinion that the comparative negligence attributable to 
Jason Merrill23 is relevant to her contractual obligations. Yardley ignores the fact that 
for equitable indemnity. That is the reason why Yardley repeatedly attempts to attribute 
Jason Merrill's claimed comparative negligence to Phoenix Indemnity. In sum, under 
subrogation, an insured's negligence is attributed to the subrogated insurer, but under 
implied indemnity, Phoenix Indemnity maintains its own cause of action for its own 
conduct — the payment of Yardley's liability. 
22
 Yardley will, undoubtedly, assert that her indemnity obligations are limited to 
60% of the $24,040.00 that she owes under the implied contract. Yardley's negligence 
percentage as determined by the jury does not affect her obligations to Phoenix 
Indemnity. In another context, the court enunciated the distinction between contractual 
obligations and tort liability: "We reject C.T.'s argument that the Personal Injury Payment 
("PIP") made by his own insurer establishes the threshold amount for his medical 
expenses. The mere fact that his PIP insurer paid for medical expenses which the jury 
found were not related to the accident should not be binding on Johnson for purposes 
of establishing the medical expenses threshold and exposing Johnson to liability for 
general damages. This is especially so since a PIP carrier has a first party contractual 
relationship with its insured — in this case C.T. — and owes certain duties to him. C.T. 
v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35, 977 P.2d 479 at n.3. 
23
 Yardley claimed that the enforcement of the terms of the implied contract are 
subject to the elements ofres judicata. Phoenix Indemnity stated in its opening 
memorandum before the district court that the amount it paid had a res judicata effect. 
That is the case because the amount paid by Phoenix Indemnity established the amount of 
Yardley's obligation. But this obligation is not owed because of doctrine ofres judicata. 
It is owed because that is one of the terms of the implied contract into which Yardley 
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Phoenix Indemnity's duties were exactly coextensive with her liability. All defenses of 
comparative negligence, proximate causation, and damages were available to and invoked 
by Phoenix Indemnity. The existence of a professed defense to her negligence does not 
prevent the application of principles of indemnification. Because Phoenix Indemnity only 
paid Jason Merrill as a result of Yardley's failure to maintain liability insurance, Phoenix 
Indemnity is entitled to restitution. This is true because Yardley's failure to maintain 
insurance constitutes "fault," as such Yardley is "liable" under the implied contract into 
which she entered with Phoenix Indemnity. 
The Restatement of Restitution addresses this issue as follows: 
A person who with another became subject to an obligation or 
supposed obligation upon which, as between the two, the other had a 
prior duty of performance, and who has made payment thereon 
although the other had a defense thereto, 
* * * 
(b) is entitled to restitution if he became subject to the 
obligation with the consent of or because of the fault of the 
other and if in making payment, he acted 
(a) in the discharge of his own duty to the creditor, or 
entered. 
Moreover, some courts have held that a stipulated agreement between two adverse 
parties is a final judgment on the merits sufficient to invoke claim preclusion in a 
subsequent case between the same parties. See, e ^ , Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork 
Pipeline Co.. 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 1995) (citing In re Medomak Canning. 922 F.2d 895, 
900 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that court-approved settlement has res judicata effect)). 
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(b) in the justifiable beiief[24] that such duty existed, or 
(c) in response to a judgment rendered against him after a 
reasonable defense because of such transaction, or 
(d) performance was required by business compulsion. 
Restatement of Restitution, Title A, Indemnity at § 78 (emphasis added). 
A. Yardley's "Fault" or "Consent" Was Her Failure to 
Maintain Insurance. 
Yardley claims that her "fault" must be her percentage of negligence as determined 
by a jury. Yardley's constant attempt to inject negligence principles into this contractual 
dispute does not obviate the fact that Yardley's "fault" was her failure to maintain 
liability insurance for the protection of innocent victims of her negligence. Because of 
her "fault" she "consented" to enter into an implied contract wherein she promised to 
indemnify Phoenix Indemnity in exchange for the provision of liability insurance 
coverage. 
Under § 78, the settlement negotiated and paid by the indemnitee may be 
recovered from the indemnitor if (under part (b)) the sums are paid because of the consent 
or fault of the indemnitor. The Utah Supreme Court referenced Black's Law Dictionary's 
24
 Yardley could have raised the objection (and attempted to prove) that Phoenix 
Indemnity intentionally paid Jason Merrill without a reasonable belief of its obligation to 
do so. Yardley has not made such an objection (not even a bald assertion). Phoenix 
Indemnity paid what it justifiably believed it (and Yardley) owed. Therefore, Yardley's 
"liability" is established as a matter of law. 
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definition of the word "fault" in Field v. Boyer Co, L.C., 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998). 
Black's Law Dictionary 608 (6th ed. 1990) defines "fault" in just 
that fashion: "Negligence; an error or defect of judgment or of 
conduct; any deviation from prudence, duty, or rectitude; any 
shortcoming, or neglect of care or performance resulting from 
inattention, incapacity, or perversity; a wrong tendency, course, or 
act; bad faith or mismanagement; neglect of duty." This definition is 
[very] b road . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). Yardley deviated from her duty to maintain liability insurance 
coverage. Failing to maintain insurance for the benefit and protection of innocent victims 
is a sufficient shortcoming to constitute "fault" under the broad definition set forth in 
Black's and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
VIII. PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S SETTLEMENT OF JASON 
MERRILL'S CLAIM DOES NOT AFFECT ITS RIGHT TO 
INDEMNIFICATION. 
It has often been stated by the Utah Supreme Court that "[settlements are favored 
in the law, and should be encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only 
to the parties, but also to the judicial system." Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Travelstead. 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979). Phoenix Indemnity's settlement with Jason 
Merrill does not preclude the application of implied indemnity principles. 
[A] person who is liable for injuries caused by the negligence or 
wrongful act of another may adjust and pay the claim therefor and 
need not wait the result of a suit in order to be entitled to indemnity 
from the wrongdoer.. . . 
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 25, page 603. 
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[T]he right to indemnity against an actual wrongdoer exists whether 
the one proceeded against in the first instance settles the loss 
voluntary or has a judgment recovered against him. In other words, 
the fact of voluntary payment does not negative the right to 
indemnity. 
Globe Indemnity Company v. Schmitt 53 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1944). In this case, the 
wrongdoer/indemnitor declined to maintain insurance or defend the proceeding; therefore, 
the third person/insured proceeded against the UM carrier/indemnitee thus requiring the 
indemnitee to carry the burden. Thus, the wrongdoer/indemnitor is conclusively bound 
by any reasonable good faith settlement the indemnitee may make. See Restatement of 
Restitution, Title A, Indemnity at § 76(f) (stating that settlement amounts have a res 
judicata effect only if the facts are addressed by § 76(f) (involving a lawsuit) or § 78 
(involving the indemnitee's personal obligation or a business compulsion)). The only 
defenses available to Yardley are collusion and bad faith settlement. Such defenses have 
not been alleged by Yardley. 
IX. PHOENIX INDEMNITY'S RECOVERY OF UM BENEFITS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT UNJUSTLY 
ENRICHING YARDLEY AND ARE DETERMINABLE 
WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF A TRIAL. 
Alternatively, an implied contract between Yardley and Phoenix Indemnity or a 
separate and distinct right of recovery arose because, otherwise, Yardley would be 
unjustly enriched. Quantum meruit has two branches, both rooted in justice. See Scheller 
v. Dixie Six Corp.. 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988). The remedy provided under 
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quantum meruit is one of restitution designed to restore to a plaintiff a benefit unjustly 
enjoyed by a defendant. See Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams. 564 
P.2d 773, 776 (Utah 1977). 
A, Unjust Enrichment. 
Phoenix Indemnity may prevail on an unjust enrichment theory by proving three 
elements: "'(I) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or 
knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the 
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.'" American Towers Owners 
Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
B. Contract Implied In Fact. 
The second branch of quantum meruit, contract implied in fact, is an actual 
contract established by conduct. See Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 
1987). The elements of a contract implied in fact are: (1) the defendant requested the 
plaintiff to provide services; (2) the plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate it for 
those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff 
expected compensation. Id 
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C. YarcUey May N o t Retain Unjust 
Enrichment . 
1. First Element: 
(a) Phoenix Indemnity conferred a benefit on Yardley. 
Yardley was neither sued nor molested by Jason Merrill. This is because Phoenix 
Indemnity stepped into the breach created by Yardley's failure to maintain liability 
insurance. Phoenix Indemnity acted as Yardley's liability insurer: It defended her, it 
adjusted the claim, and it paid the amounts she owed. It is undisputed that Phoenix 
Indemnity meets the first element to entitle it to a remedy for unjust enrichment. 
(b) Yardley Requested (because the Law Imputes a 
Request) That Phoenix Indemnity Provide UM 
Coverage as a Result of the Collision. 
An uninsured motorist's failure to maintain liability insurance coverage is a 
request for services from a UM carrier, as a matter of law. Liability insurance is 
mandatory and uninsured motorists are freeloaders who increase the cost of insurance for 
those who pay premiums. The goal of liability insurance is to protect innocent victims. 
Therefore, the Court may properly infer from the structure of Utah's Financial 
Responsibility statute a legislative intent to impute a request for coverage from the 
victim's UM carrier to uninsured motorists. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 268 
(Utah App. 1987) (quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 18 (1963) (noting that 
implied contracts impose contractive duty by reason of promissory expression and are no 
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different than express contracts, although different in mode of expressing assent)). 
Yardley's mode of expressing assent to Phoenix Indemnity's provision of services for 
which she was primarily responsible was her failure to maintain liability insurance. 
2. Second Element: 
(a) Yardley Knew About the Benefits Conferred Upon Her 
by Phoenix Indemnity. 
Yardley knew about Phoenix Indemnity's provision of these benefits to her as 
evidenced by the letter from her attorney. See Exhibit B attached to Phoenix Indemnity's 
opening memorandum. Moreover, the law imputes knowledge of the benefit to her for 
the reasons set forth above. Yardley's knowledge or imputed knowledge is not disputed. 
(b) Phoenix Indemnity Provided UM Benefits to Jason 
Merrill With the Expectation That Yardley Would 
Reimburse It. 
Phoenix Indemnity expected reimbursement from Yardley. When Phoenix 
Indemnity settled Jason Merrill's claims against Yardley, it demanded and received an 
agreement from Jason Merrill in which he agreed to assist Phoenix Indemnity in 
recovering from Yardley. See Exhibit F attached to Phoenix Indemnity's opening 
memorandum. Phoenix Indemnity's expectation of reimbursement is not disputed. 
3. Third Element: 
(a) Yardley's Retention of the Benefits Bestowed Upon 
Her by Phoenix Indemnity Would be Inequitable. 
It would be grossly inequitable for Yardley to retain the benefits bestowed upon 
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her by Phoenix Indemnity. Although Phoenix Indemnity bestowed a benefit upon 
Yardley, it never intended that she retain the benefits. If Yardley were permitted to retain 
the benefits bestowed upon her, she (and all other uninsured motorists) would be given 
judicially-sanctioned freeloader status. The efficient operation of automobile insurance 
for the benefit and protection of those who pay their premiums cannot continue where 
freeloaders are permitted to retain all of the benefits of insurance coverage without paying 
any premiums. Yardley's retention of the benefits bestowed upon her by Phoenix 
Indemnity would be unjust and inequitable. Therefore, as a matter of law, Yardley owes 
reimbursement of the payment made to Jason Merrill as UM benefits. 
(b) Yardley Knew or Should Have Known that Phoenix 
Indemnity Would Expect Her to Reimburse It. 
Yardley knew, should have known, or knowledge is properly imputed to her, 
whether personally or through her attorneys, that Phoenix Indemnity would expect 
reimbursement of the sums it paid to Jason Merrill on her behalf. 
X. PHOENIX INDEMNITY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT IN 
THE AMOUNT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FULL 
REIMBURSEMENT, INCLUDING COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to recover its costs and attorney fees from Yardley: 
[I]f the party secondarily liable on an obligation is obliged to pay the 
obligation, he is entitled to full reimbursement from the party 
primarily liable. 
37 
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 20, page 595. And full reimbursement includes costs and attorney 
fees because Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to be saved harmless. "An indemnitee is not 
'held harmless' . . . if it must incur expenses to vindicate its rights." Hanover Limited v. 
Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 1988) (permitting recovery of attorney fees 
incurred in connection with defending against secondary liability, but denying25 an 
indemnitee attorney fees incurred in connection with enforcing the implied indemnity 
contract); see also South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Utah App. 
1988); Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992) (explaining that the award of 
attorney fees as consequential damages, outside the context of statutory and contractual 
authorization — including implied contractual authorizations such as explained above — 
should be limited to two situations: insurance contracts and the third-party exception). 
Under the circumstances of this case involving insurance, attorney fees may be 
considered an item of consequential damages if the attorney fees were foreseeable. See 
Canvon Country Store v. Bracev. 781 P.2d 414, 419-20 (Utah 1989). Attorney fees are 
recoverable if they were "reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably 
foreseeable by, the parties at the time the [implied] contract was made." Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). 
25
 Phoenix Indemnity acknowledges that under the general rule it would not be 
entitled to recover attorney fees for enforcing the indemnity contract, but this case is 
distinguishable from the cases applying the general rule. 
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This litigation is a "natural consequence" or a "reasonably foreseeable" result of 
Yardley's breach of her obligations which are mandated by statute for the protection of 
the public. It falls under the maxim that every man (or woman or insurance company) 
must be held to intend the natural and probable consequence of his deeds. 
Second, the third-party tort rule provides for an award of attorney fees. The Utah 
Court of Appeals described the rule as follows: 
[W]hen the natural consequences of one's negligence is another's 
involvement in a dispute with a third party, attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in resolving the dispute are recoverable from the negligent 
party as an element of damages. 
South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, Yardley negligently injured Jason Merrill while she was performing 
the business of her employer. Under these circumstances, litigation with her, her 
employer or her employer's insurance company is a natural consequence26 of her 
26
 The Utah Supreme Court has used the phrase "natural consequence" to denote 
foreseeable result by defining special damages. "Special damages are a particular type of 
damages which are a natural consequence of the injury caused but are not the type of 
damages that necessarily flow from the harmful act." Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 
P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) (citing Cohn v. J.C. Pennev. 537 P.2d 306, 307 (Utah 1975) 
("Special damages are those which occur as a natural consequence of the harm done but 
are not so certain to flow therefrom as to be implied in law.") (emphasis added)). 
In addition, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Richards v. Standard Accident 
Ins. Co., 200 P. 1017, 1023 (Utah 1921) {quoting Western Commercial Travelers' Assoc, 
v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898)) "defined 'the natural and probable consequence' 
of an act as follows: 'The natural consequence of means used [is] the consequence which 
ordinarily follows from their use-the result which may be reasonably anticipated from 
their use, and which ought to be expected.'" Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F. Supp. 
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negligence. Moreover, the vehicle driven by Yardley was not insured at the time of her 
accident, therefore, the prospect of third-party litigation becomes not only natural; rather 
it was a foregone conclusion. 
XI. YARDLEY'S UNCLEAN HANDS PREVENTS THE COURT 
FROM CONSIDERING HER DEFENSES TO 
REIMBURSEMENT. 
Yardley did not do equity; therefore, she may not seek equity. Despite Yardley's 
failure to maintain liability insurance covering the vehicle operated by her at the time of 
the collision, Yardley operated the vehicle on public roads. Yardley's failure to comply 
with the statutory requirement of liability coverage for the protection of innocent victims 
1270, 1279 (D. Utah 1995) {quoting Richards, 200 P. at 1023) (alteration in original) 
(anticipating Utah law in defining "accident" as used in homeowner's policy). 
In addition, in Pacific Coast, the defendant had issued a bond indemnifying 
plaintiff title company from any loss resulting from defaults by a builder, the Court 
examined the rule for recovering damages for breach of contract and its emphasis on 
foreseeability. The Court concluded with this analysis: 
[I]t could reasonably be foreseen that the natural and usual 
consequence of Cassady's failure to pay the laborers and 
materialmen would bring about the series of events which occurred: 
that liens would be filed and legal proceedings instituted to enforce 
them; that plaintiff Title Company, having the duty to keep the titles 
clear, would interpose defenses and attend to some disposition of the 
claims, which would require the services of attorneys.... 
Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Ind. Co.. 325 P.2d 906, 908 (Utah 
1958). The same analysis applies to the instant case as was employed in Pacific Coast — 
Phoenix Indemnity's employment of attorneys to sue Yardley was a natural consequence 
of Yardley's negligence. Therefore, equity demands that its attorney fees be recoverable 
from Yardley. 
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is misconduct27 that renders any pleas for equity by Yardley to be disregarded by the 
Court. "No maxim of equity is older or more venerated than 'He who seeks redress in a 
court of equity must come with clean hands.' The very foundation of equity is good 
conscience, and any conduct in connection with the matter in controversy which does not 
comport with good conscience should preclude any relief being granted." Dowse v. 
Kammerman. 246 P.2d 881 (Utah 1952) (Crockett, J. dissenting). 
XII. THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED TO THE DISTRICT COURT IS 
SUFFICIENT FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES. 
The one-third contingency fee set forth in the affidavit submitted to the district 
court is standard in the industry for recovery of UM benefits. Moreover, the affidavit of 
Taylor D. Carr provides the Court with sworn testimony that he and his firm were 
retained on a one-third contingency basis and have incurred many hours of effort in 
attempting to collect the judgment. Therefore, Phoenix Indemnity is entitled to be 
reimbursed for the attorney fees that it is required to pay to its attorneys. 
Lastly, findings are unnecessary to support an award of attorney fees where the 
relevant facts are undisputed. See Freed Fin. Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039, 
27
 "Misconduct which will bar relief in a court of equity need not necessarily be of 
such nature as to be punishable as crime or to constitute the basis of legal action. Under 
this maxim, any willful act in regard to the matter in litigation, which would be 
condemned and pronounced wrongful by honest and fair-minded men, will be sufficient 
to make the hands of the applicant unclean." Dowse v. Kammerman. 246 P.2d 881 
(Utah 1952) (Crockett, J. dissenting). 
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1040 (Utah 1975) (attorney fees may be awarded on summary judgment if the record 
contains a stipulation, an unrebutted affidavit, or evidence supporting the reasonableness 
of the award); South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988) 
(uncontroverted testimony concerning amount of reasonable fee provides adequate basis 
for fee award). 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal concerns the enforcement of an implied contract. The terms of the 
implied contract arose as a matter of law, are governed by equity, and are not disputed. 
The Court may properly apply the legal precepts set forth in §§ 76 and 78 of the 
Restatement of Restitution to the undisputed facts of this case. All of the elements of 
equitable indemnification are satisfied by the undisputed facts. 
In addition to full reimbursement, Phoenix Indemnity's attorney fees are a 
recoverable measure of consequential damages in this case. Judgment should enter 
against Yardley for damages owing under the implied indemnity contract in the sum of 
$40,868.00. 
DATED this XXday of March, 2001. 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J ^ T d a y of March, 2001, a true and correct 
copy of Brief of Appellant Pkoenix Indemnity Insurance Company was mailed, 
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mr. Paul M. Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
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Telephone: (801)532-7080 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT 




MARLENE T. SMITH, aka MARLENE ; 
YARDLEY and YARDLEY INN, a Utah ; 
limited liability company, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER RE MOTION FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) AND MOTION FOR 
) CONTINUANCE 
I Civil No. 980600228 
i Judge David L. Mower 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on February 16, 2000 before the 
Honorable David L. Mower with the parties appearing through their counsel of record. The 
matters before the court were Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Continuance. 
The issues having been briefed by the parties as well as argued orally and the Court 
09 , 21 PH l Id 
having considered the written memoranda and the oral arguments and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court determined that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion for Continuance should be denied. 
1. With respect to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court has 
determined that there are no disputed issues of fact, and therefore, the Court decides the same as 
a matter of law. 
2. Based upon the pleadings filed by the defendants and oral argument by the 
defendants' counsel, the Court treats defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment as a Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Claims of Breach of Implied Indemnity Contract, Unjust Enrichment and Restitution. 
2. Based upon the pleadings and argument provided to the Court, the Court agrees 
with the argument of the defendants and determines that as a matter of law there is no implied 
contract as between plaintiffs and defendants. Simply put, an implied indemnity claim or any 
other claim under quasi contract principles as against the defendants are not proper causes of 
action in this context. Accordingly, plaintiffs may not proceed under a theory of implied 
indemnity as against the defendants. Likewise, as a matter of law, plaintiffs do not have any 
other quasi contract claim as against the defendants, including but not limited to, unjust 
enrichment, restitution and the like. 
3. To the extent that plaintiffs may recover as against the defendants, plaintiffs must 
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establish that the defendants' negligence or proportion of fault is greater than that of Phoenix 
Indemnity's insured, Jason David Merrill, and that such negligence or fault was the proximate 
cause of damages, if any, suffered by Jason David Merrill. 
4. Based upon plaintiffs' counsel's representations that plaintiffs no longer seek a 
continuance in this matter, the motion for continuance is denied. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
2. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance is DENIED. 
DATED this [}_ day of March, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
Q/i^ 
David L. Mower 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Trent J. Waddoups 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / day of^cbruaiy, 2000 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order re: Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Continuace was mailed, first 
class postage prepaid, to: 
Taylor D. Can-
Trent J. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
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ATTORNEYS AT L-W, L.L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 609 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
Fax: (801)363-8512 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, MANTI DEPARTMENT 
PHOENIX INDEMNITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY and 
JASON DAVID MERRILL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARLENE T. SMITH, a.k.a. MARLENE 
YARDLEY, and YARDLEY INN, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 9 8 0 6 0 0 2 2 8 
Judge David L. Mower 
Based upon the Stipulated Motion submitted by Plaintiffs and Defendants, Utah R 
Civ. P. 41(a)(2), and for good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action be, and hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
DATED th of My, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
QJI^ 
Honorable David L. Mower 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
